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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE INCIDENT AT CAVALESE AND STRATEGIC COMPENSATION
Penny wise, pound foolish.
-Benjamin Franklin, Poor Richard's Almanack
In 1953 the United States ratified the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Status of
Forces Agreement of 1951 (SOFA),' which set forth "conditions and terms which will con-
trol the status of forces sent by one state, party to the Agreement, into the territory of an-
other state, party to the Agreement."2 The drafters foresaw that the presence and training
of foreign military forces within and between their territories would probably, if not inevi-
tably, cause injury to civilians, giving rise to claims that, if not settled quickly and satis-
factorily, could spark incidents disruptive to their cooperation in mutual defense. To this
end, the SOFA established ajurisdictional regime designed to minimize the political friction
these incidents threatened to generate, by providing prompt and manifestly fair settlement
procedures. The SOFA's jurisdictional framework protects nationals of a foreign military
force from the criminal processes of the alienjurisdiction in which they reside and train, yet
permits injured citizens of the host state to pursue civil damages for the tortious acts of for-
eign forces without fear that their claims might receive prejudicial treatment in the foreign
state's local courts.
Year in, year out over the past half century, the SOFA has contributed to maintaining
good relations with the people in NATO host states. This result was vital to NATO's opera-
tions, for, in democratic host states, popular toleration, if not support, is a political conditio
sine qua non for the transnational stationing of foreign military forces. But context is impor-
tant to understanding and effectively implementing any legal instrument and its juris-
dictional regime. The SOFA was enacted in the midst of the Cold War. Its jurisdictional
regime presumes that the public within NATO states perceives the presence and training
exercises of foreign military forces in its midst as serving national security. The end of the
Cold War has eroded this presumption in the popular mind, even though security special-
ists, who must systematically project and assess a wider range of contingencies, continue to
appreciate the geostrategic value of the transnational stationing of NATO forces. Unques-
tionably, the SOFA still serves many of the values-regularity, efficiency, predictability,
cooperation in the investigation of transnational incidents, and so forth-for which it was
designed. But transposed to the post-ColdWar context, thejurisdictional and compensatory
regimes it established may no longer suffice in every situation to preserve the delicate
political preconditions NATO states once took for granted.
' Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Regarding the Status of Their
ForcesJune 19,1951,4 UST 1792,199 UNTS 67 [hereinafter SOFA]. The United States ratified the SOFAonJuly
24, 1953, subject to Senate reservations intended to ensure that no "person subject to the militaryjurisdiction of
the United States" would be tried by a foreign court under a legal regime that neglected "procedural safeguards
contained in the Constitution of the United States." Statement Included in the Instrument of Ratification of the United
States of America, 199 UNTS at 68.
'MurrayL. Schwartz, InternationalLaw and theNATO Status ofForcesAgreement 53 COLUM. L. REv. 1091,1091 (1953).
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Perhaps no event in recent memory makes this point more clearly than the tragedy
inadvertendy caused by a U.S. aircraft at Cavalese, Italy, in February 1998. This incident and
its aftermath offer a paradigm for rethinking the post-Cold War operation of the SOFA and
for understanding how changes in the political context in which it operates may now coun-
sel a more flexible-or, at least, less exclusive-application of its formal terms.
I. THE INCIDENT AND ITS AFTERMATH
On February 3, 1998, at approximately 3:15 P.M., a U.S. Marine EA-6B Prowler engaged
in a low-level training flight in the northern Italian Alps severed a cable-car line at the
Cermis ski resort in Cavalese. The attached gondola plummeted over three hundred feet,
killing twenty people3 from six states: eight Germans, five Belgians, three Italians, two Poles,
one Dutchman, and one Austrian.4 The U.S. aircraft had been "redeployed at Aviano air
base as part of Operation Deliberate Guard in support of the multinational Stabilization
Force (SFOR) in Bosnia."5 At the time of the accident, its pilot, Capt. RichardJ. Ashby, had
been flying one of dozens of daily low-level training missions in the region. NATO deemed
these missions necessary to prepare pilots "to fly below enemy radar and maneuver in moun-
tainous terrain, such as that in Bosnia-Herzegovina."6
The incident did not come as a complete surprise to local residents. Since the 1980s, resi-
dents of Cavalese had protested againstNATO training operations, which both Italian and
U.S. aircraft conduct routinely. On four prior occasions, unidentified warplanes had hit ski-
lift cables in the region, but there had been no casualties. Mauro Gilmozzi, the mayor of
Cavalese, had lodged a formal protest, but NATO authorities, including the Italian Air
Force, responded that the training "was safe and in the interest of national defense."7
The Cavalese incident ignited immediate political and legal explosions. On the political
front, the Communist Refoundation Party, which had long opposed the American military
presence, seized on the issue and demanded closure of the Aviano base.8 A public prose-
cutor, Francantonio Granero, initiated a preliminary investigation pursuant to Article 112
of the Italian Constitution, and on May 27, 1998, he indicted the four-man crew and three
of its supervisory officers on charges of manslaughter and negligent endangerment of the
safety of public transport. But on July 13, 1998, at the preliminary hearing at the Court of
Trento, the Italian judge, citing Article VII, paragraph 3(a) (ii) of the SOFA, found that
primary criminaljurisdiction for this matter had been assigned to the United States; accord-
ingly, he dismissed the case.
9
-'See U.S. Military BlamedforFatal Crash atltalyResort;Alps: Up to 20Killed When Low-FlyingMarine Plane Cuts Cable,
LA. TIMEs, Feb. 4,1998, atA12. According to Senator Robb, a former marine who subsequently introduced a bill
to compensate the victims directly:
Just minutes from [the plane's] scheduled return to base, the pilot suddenly caught a glimpse of a yellow
gondola off to his right at eye level.
Asplitsecond later, he spotted the two cables that carried the gondola, and, fearingfor his life, lie put the
plane into a dive. His actions probably saved the lives of the four-member crew, but it was not enough to
prevent the wingtip from clipping the cables.
The plane's wing had stretched and then snapped the cables supporting the gondola, which was then 307
feet above the valley floor.
145 CONG. REc. S3076-02, *83086 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1999) (statement of Sen. Charles S. Robb).
' The deceased included a Polish mother and her 14-year-old son, seven German friends, and five Belgian
friends, including a recently engaged couple. See 145 CONG. REC., supra note 3, at *$3086.
5 Annalisa Ciampi, Case Note, Public Prosecutor v. Ashby, 93 AJIL 219, 219 (1999).
6Paul Richter, Cohen Calls for Review of NATO Flights; Military: U.S. Defense Chief Meets with Italian Counterpart in
Wake of Italian Ski-Lift Crash, LA. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 1998, at 19 (home ed.).
7 Richard Boudreaux, Tolerance Is Low forLow-Flight Training, LA TIMES, Feb. 23, 1998, atAl.
5 See U.S. Military Blamed for Fatal Crash at Italy Resort, supra note 3.
9 See Ciampi, supra note 5, at 219-21.
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Article VII of the SOFA allocates criminal jurisdiction between the "sending State," the
party to which the force belongs, and the "receiving State," the party "in the territory of
which the force or civilian component is located, whether it be stationed there or passing
in transit."'10 It distinguishes crimes punishable (1) under the laws of the sending state with
respect to persons subject to that state's military law; (2) under the laws of the receiving
state with respect to persons subject to that state's territorialjurisdiction; (3) under the laws
of the sending but not the receiving state; and (4) under the laws of the receiving but not
the sending state." With respect to the latter two categories, the SOFA vests exclusivejuris-
diction in whichever state's laws have been violated.1 2 Where concurrentjurisdiction exists,
however, the allocation of criminal jurisdiction becomes a function of the nature of the
crime. The military authorities of the sending state enjoy the "primary right to exercise
jurisdiction" in relation to (i) offenses against the property or security of that state, includ-
ing that of its forces, its civilian components, and their respective dependents; and (ii) of-
fenses "arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty." The
receiving state maintainsjurisdictional primacywith respect to all other offenses.' 3 Applying
these terms to the prosecution's indictment request, the Italian judge had found that the
offenses at issue arose out of "acts or omissions done in the performance of official duty."
Thus, primaryjurisdiction vested in the United States.
Quite independently of the jurisdictional allocations described above, however, authori-
ties of the receiving and sending NATO states undertake to cooperate in the investigation
of criminal offenses governed by the SOFA. 4 Accordingly, shortlyafter the incident, aboard
composed of six U.S. Marine Corps officers, one U.S. Air Force officer, and one Italian Air
Force officer conducted an investigation.'5 On March 3, 1998, the board published its re-
port. It found that, although ground supervisors had neglected to advise the aircrew of the
two-thousand-foot low altitude restriction applicable to training flights in the Cavalese
region, principal blame for the incident remained with Captain Ashby and his crew, for
" [t] he alrcrew aggressively maneuvered their aircraft, exceeded the maximum airspeed and
flew well below 1000 feet."' 6 In view of its findings, the board referred the four crew mem-
bers for pretrial investigation pursuant to Article 32 of the U.S. Uniform Code of Military
Justice but recommended only "disciplinary action" for the crew's supervisors.' 7 Captain
"5 SOFA, supra note 1, Art. I(d)-(e).
II See id., Art. VII(l)-(2).
12 See id.
11 Id., Art. VII(3) (a) (i)-(ii). Article VII(3) (c) stipulates, however, that the state enjoying primaryjurisdiction
shall give "sympathetic consideration" to requests from other states forjurisdictional waiver "in cases where that
other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance."
14 See id., Art. VII(6).
IS See Ciampi, supra note 5, at 220.
'6 Findings of the board, annexed to prosecutor's request for committal to trial, quoted in Ciampi, supra note
5, at 220; see alsoSteven Lee Myers, Pentagon BlamesJet's Crewfor Ski-Lift Disaster in Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1998,
at Al (summarizing the board's findings). Myers reported that the
Pentagon has concluded that the American pilot and crew were responsible for the accident last month that
killed 20 people when a Marine Corpsjet struck a ski lift's cable in Italy ....
... [T]he Marinejet, an EA-6B Prowler, was flying too low and too fastwhen it sheared the cable near the
resort town of Cavalese, sending a gondola full of skiers hurtling more than 300 feet to the ground ....
Id.
1 See Ciampi, supra note 5, at 220. Ciampi argues that, under the terms of the SOFA, the judge correctly
dismissed Granero's request for an indictment of the four crew members in deference to the formal proceedings
initiated against them underArticle 32 of the U.S. Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice. Butwith respect to the three
supervisors, Italy arguably retained jurisdiction, for
[w] hen the sending state's action is limited to disciplinary measures, there is reason to doubtwhether the receiv-
ing state is barred from exercisingits subordinate right to prosecute. It is even more doubtful thata bar to subse-
quent trial arises from a decision not to prosecute that has been reached after only an informal investigation.
Id. at 223-24. Whether or not U.S. disciplinary proceedings against the supervisory officers divested Italy of
criminal jurisdiction over them, Ciampi's observation highlights the broad dispersal of responsibility that distin-
2000]
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Ashby and his navigator, Capt.Joseph Schweitzer, were indicted for negligent homicide and
involuntary manslaughter, charges that, if proven, carry a life sentence in military prison.
A subsequent investigation, which revealed that Schweitzer and Ashby had collaborated in
attempting to destroy videotaped evidence, led to a second court-martial on charges of ob-
struction and conspiracy to obstructjustice.1' In March 1999, Ashby was acquitted of respon-
sibility for the accident itself,1 9 though both he and Schweitzer pleaded guilty to obstruction
ofjustice. °
Ashby clearly benefited from the criminal evidentiary standard of "beyond reasonable
doubt" codified in Article 51 (c) of the U.S. Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice.2 ' But his ac-
quittal on the twenty counts of manslaughter nonetheless shocked sectors of popular opin-
ion in many NATO allies, especially those whose nationals had perished in the crash.2" The
verdict particularly aroused the Italian public, some ofwhom were led to question the integ-
rity of the process that culminated in Ashby's acquittal." Some Italian officials reacted even
more vehemently.24 Achille Occhetto, who presided over the lower house's fbreign affairs
committee, called the verdict an "act ofarrogance and prevarication"; 5 and Undersecretary
of Defense Paolo Guerrini requested that, in light of the verdict, the Italian parliament
reconsider those SOFAprovisions that hadvested primaryjurisdiction in the United States.2
The Clinton administration's initial response to this indignation appeared sympathetic
and conciliatory. Speaking at ajoint press conference with Italian Prime Minister D'Alema,
President Clinton stated that "the United States must clearly and unambiguously shoulder
guishes the circumstances surrounding the Cavalese tragedy. Blame for the incidentmayhave resided notonlywith
the aircrew, but also with its supervisors and, perhaps most critically, those responsible for drafting and updating
the air maps relied upon by Ashby's crew. See Estes Thompson, Flawed Map Cited in Ski Gondola Deaths, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 1,1999 (noting that Ashby's defense counsel argued that, had he not relied upon a dated map--
which failed to indicate the resortcables even though the system had been builtin 1966-hewould nothave flown
into the Cavalese valley at all); see also Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Maps Become Legal Issue in Alpine Cable Accident, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13,1999, atA3 (speculating that, perhaps to deflect culpabilityfrom the U.S. government, the Defense
Department has refused to update the maps in the wake of the incident and insisted on their adequacy). Skepticism
about the accuracy of the maps appears to have figured prominently in Ashby's ultimate acquittal.
18 See Marine Fliers Tried to Hide Evidence, Prosecutors Say, LA TIMES, Sept. 22, 1998, at B4.
" See Richard J. Newman, An Accident, an Acquittal, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 15, 1999, at 43, available
in1999 WL 8432404. The militaryjury acquitted Ashbylargely because "of mistakes beyond his control, including
the Marine Corps's failure to mark the ski lift on aviation maps." Id. In May the jury sentenced Ashby to six
months' imprisonment and a dishonorable discharge for helping to destroy the videotape evidence. See Estes
Thompson, Ski Tragedy Pilot Sentenced, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., May 11, 1999, at A3. Ashby was released on October
12,1999, approximately one month early, "forgood behavior," according to Marine Corps spokesman Bill Lisbon.
See US Pilot Who Caused Italian Gondola Disaster Gets Early Releasefrom Prison, Agence France-Presse, Oct. 12, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 25123088.
20 See Marine Guilty in Gondola Crash, CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 30, 1999, at 2A; Richard Serrano, Marine Pilot in
Gondola Deaths Gets Six Months and Discharge BUFFALO NEWS, May 11, 1999, atA2.
21 10 U.S.C. §851 (1994).
' Lothar Naumann, mayor of the German city of Burgstaedt, where seven of the eight Germans killed were
members of a ski club, stated, "Until now, I have been a convinced supporter of the Americanjustice system. But
this is incomprehensible." Marine Pilot Ashby Acquitted on All Cavalese Charges, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Mar. 4,
1999, available in LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years. Sindy Renkewitz, whose father and sister died
in the crash, said she was "shocked" and could not "understand that the man who killed 20 people.., is not
guilty." Henriette LowischJury Acquits Marine Pilot in Italian SkiLiftDisaster, Agence France-Presse, Mar. 5,1999,
available in 1999 WL 2557811.
23An editorial in La Repubblica characterized the verdict as "impunity of the mighty" and evidence of the power
of America's "military-industrial complex." See Suzette Bloch, Italy Shocked by Acquittal of U.S. Pilot over Ski Lip
Disaster, Agence France-Presse, Mar. 5,1999, available in 1999 WL 2558483. Klaus Stampfl, the son of Maria Steiner,
a 60-year-old retired shopkeeper who died in the crash, attended Ashby's court-martial at the U.S. Marine base
at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. At its conclusion, he reportedly remarked, "It's a shameful verdict.... It was
certainly not a serious trial, not as serious as it would have been in Italy." Italian Reaction Decidedly Bitter: Families,
Officials Decry Injustice, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Mar. 5, 1999, at A14.24 See Marine Pilot Ashby Acquitted on All Cavalese Charges, supra note 22.
' Italian Reaction Decidedly Bitter, supra note 23.
26 See id.; see also Pilot's Acquittal Stuns Italy, AP, Mar. 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL 1383487.
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the responsibility for what happened, "2 a proposal strongly endorsed editorially by the New
York Times, which called for "substantially increased compensation without delay."28 While
U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen denied official knowledge of tampering with the
evidence, he pledged that "the United States, which ha[d] offered $100,000 to the families
ofvictims to defray some immediate expenses, also intend [ed] to quickly honor other claims
that ha[d] been brought by the victims' families under the NATO treaty with Italy."
29
Secretary Cohen's statement referred to Article VIII of the SOFA, which provides that,
where claims arise out of "acts or omissions of members of a force or civilian component
done in the performance of official duty" and that "caus [e] damage in the territory of the
receiving State to third parties," the receiving state shall settle these claims in accordance
with its domestic law.30 Subsequently, the costs incurred in satisfying the adjudicated claims
shall be distributed between the receiving and the sending states according to a scale that
varies on the basis of their respective responsibility for the injury. Where, as here, "one send-
ing State alone is responsible, the amount awarded or adjudged shall be distributed in the
proportion of 25 per cent. chargeable to the receiving State and 75 per cent. chargeable to
the sending State."31 At no time did the United States repudiate this formal legal obligation.
In May 1999, however, Congress rejected an amendment to the Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act, sponsored by Senator Charles S. Robb of Virginia, that had been intro-
duced in early March, immediately after Ashby's acquittal. The measure would have allo-
cated $40 million to the Secretary of Defense, empowering him to make payments of up to
$2 million to each victim's family, solely for settling "claims arising from the deaths caused
by the accident involving a United States Marine Corps EA-6B aircraft on February 3, 1998,
near Cavalese, Italy.", 2 The amendment did not purport, either directly or by implication,
to modify the operation of the SOFA. To the contrary, it clarified its purpose by stating that
"[a] ny amount paid to a person under this section is intended to supplement any amount
subsequently determined to be payable to the person under [domestic legislation enabling
payments under the SOFA]."
Senator Robb, a former marine who had been attempting to persuade the Pentagon to
compensate the victims' families since the previous summer,3 4 urged his colleagues to en-
dorse the bill so as to "restore our nation's credibility around the world and maintain the
honor and integrity of the United States Marines .... While compensation cannot replace
the lost children, husbands and wives, it can demonstrate that we accept complete responsi-
bility for their deaths." 5 The senator also noted that, even if the SOFA provides the exclu-
sive remedy for injuries caused by U.S. forces abroad acting in their official capacity, it
would not preclude alternative, still less supplementary, compensation schemes. After all,
much of the evidence produced at the court-martial implicated not only the crew, but the
United States military authorities more broadly. In a letter to his colleagues, Senator Robb
emphasized that
27Joint Press Conference of the President and Prime Minister D'Alema of Italy, M2 Presswire, Mar. 9, 1999, at 3-4,
available in LEXIS, News, Publications.55 Ainerica's Obligation in Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1999, at Al 8.
Richter, supra note 6; see also SOFA, supra note 1, Art. VIII (setting forth compensatory provisions).
"SOFA, supra note 1, Art. VIII(5).
s' Id., Art. VIII(5) (e) (i). This division serves to prevent the host state from exploiting accidents in which the
sending state is principally at fault by authorizing potentially outrageous damage awards. By apportioning a 25%
share to the host state, the SOFA regime seeks to ensure that the host state's courts or legislative processes
calculate any resultant civil damage award in an equitable and unbiased manner.
s' Emergency SupplementalAppropriations Actof1999, Robb (and others) AmendmentNo. 131, S. 544,106th
Cong. §203(a) (1999).
s Id. §203(e) (emphasis added); see also 10 U.S.C. §127 (1994) (authorizing the Secretary of Defense to make
.emergency and extraordinary expenses").
s See Gondola Victims'Redress Dropped, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., May 15, 1999, at A6.
s Open Letter from U.S. Sen. Charles S. Robb (Va.) to the U.S. Senate (Mar. 10, 1999) (on file with authors).
2000]
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there is plenty of fault to go around: the map we supplied the pilot did not show the
cable crossing the valley at 500 feet-even though it had been there for 30 years the
equipment in the plane had a history of malfunctioning; orders regarding the proper
speed and altitude were never adequately communicated to pilots. While it may never
be clear exactly which individual act caused the accident, it is clear that ultimate
responsibility lies with the United States.35
More critically, Senator Robb pointed out that failure to compensate the victims' families
carried broad political ramifications. Some of the Cavalese victims' families had "been
pushed nearly into poverty, having lost their primary means of financial support. 3 7 Viewed
against the backdrop of Ashby's acquittal, the perceived U.S. refusal to acknowledge
responsibility by directly compensating the victims conveyed an international image anti-
thetical to "the honor of the United States and the honor of the United States Marine
Corps."" With U.S. armed forces stationed on foreign territories throughout the globe, the
damage to its reputation that the United States would incur among its allies, Robb argued,
would prove far more costly than the comparatively trivial sum required to compensate the
victims' families. Indeed, while the proposed amendment requested $40 million in repara-
tions, "[t] o put that into some perspective, the plane involved in this accident cost some $60
million, and fortunately for us neither the plane nor the crew were lost."
39
Robb's amendment passed by unanimous voice vote during the Senate's consideration of
the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act in March, but the House of Representa-
tives did not pass a corresponding provision and the bill was dropped in conference." After
its rejection by the House, Senator Robb reiterated his concern, noting that" 'the families
are the victims, and our allies will continue to interpret this action as an unwillingness' for
the United States to bear the consequences of the accident."41 In May he reintroduced the
amendment, with the cosponsorship of Senators OlympiaJ. Snowe,JeffBingaman, Patrick
J. Leahy, andJ. Robert Kerrey, as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act
for the fiscal year 2000. This time, however, despite the efforts of its sponsors duringJune,
July, and August, the bill ran afoul of floor politics and the opposition of the Department
of Defense.
Immediately prior to Senator Robb's initial introduction of the Cavalese legislation in
March, Senator Strom Thurmond, aniong other interested parties, had been observed to
approach Robb on the Senate floor and offer "to deal." Thurmond wanted to condition any
payments to German victims of the Cavalese tragedy on the German government's willing-
ness to provide expedited compensation for an unrelated incident: the collision between
a United States Air Force C-141 Starlifter aircraft and a German Luftwaffe Tupelov TU-
154M aircraft off the coast of Namibia in 1997.42 Though Robb considered this linkage in-
apposite, 3 he responded that he would have been open to discussing the matter had it been
6 Id.
37 145 CONG. REC., supra note 3, at *S3087.
' StaffNotes for U.S. Sen. Charles S. Robb on the Robb-Snowe Amendment (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Robb Staff Notes].
39 145 CONG. REC., supra note 3, at *S3087.
41 SeeLegislative Notes on the Robb-Snowe Amendment (on file with authors).
4 Bargainers in CongressDrop Gondola Payments, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), May 14, 1999, atA8 (quoting
Senator Robb).
12 The Namibia crash killed nine U.S. AirForce servicemen, and subsequent separate investigations, conducted
by German and U.S. authorities, "both assigned responsibility for the collision and deaths to the German crew,
who not only filed an inaccurate flight plan, but were flying at the wrong altitude." Open Letter from U.S. Sen.
Strom Thurmond to the U.S. Senate (May 6,1999) (on file with authors). For a discussion ofThurmond's efforts
to condition compensation to German victims ofthe Cavalese incidenton "comparable" payments by the German
government for the Namibia incident, see generally Matthew L. Wald, Claims Collide in 2 Accidents as Next of Kin
Await Redress, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, §1, at 7.
43 While Senator Thurmond requested "comparable restitution" for the families of the U.S. aircrew killed in
the Namibia incident, see Open Letter from Sen. Strom Thurmond, supra note 42, several factors distinguish the
[Vol. 94:505
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raised at an earlier stage. But because Thurmond had broached the issue only seconds be-
fore he intended to introduce the Cavalese measure, Robb could not redraft the amend-
ment without further delaying action on the Senate floor. In response, Thurmond subse-
quently introduced a separate amendment barring payments to German nationals under
the Robb bill until Germany provided reparations for the Namibia incident. Both pieces of
legislation died in the House in March. However, when Senator Robb again attempted to
introduce the Cavalese compensation amendment in May, he chose to accommodate
Thurmond's interests by integrating the German contingency into the draft legislation.44
But Thurmond's conditions proved to be only one of a panoply of interests that combined
to thwart Robb's efforts.'
The Department of Defense vigorously opposed the bill. Its position, expressed in a letter
from Secretary of Defense William Cohen, was that the "NATO SOFA provides the exclusive
remedy for claims involving official duties of the U.S. military causing damage in NATO
countries. "" Among other objections, Secretary Cohen argued that "the precedent that
would be set by making payments in settlement of these claims outside of the NATO process
would not, in the long run, be in the best interests of the United States or of other NATO
countries."47 The Defense Department contended that there was no legal authorization for
such payments. As a strategic matter, it evidently felt that claimants in future accidents
might demand like compensation, causing the eventual atrophy and displacement of the
SOFA legal regime, which had operated so effectively to settle similar incidents for the past
fifty years: "I share completely your strong desire to see that all the families of the victims
in this case are properly and fairly compensated as soon as possible," Secretary Cohen wrote.
"I continue to believe, however, that the NATO claims process is capable of doing this, as
it has since its inception in 1951.""
The Defense Department's legal claim, as Senator Robb had noted in March, was doubtful
because negligent acts that had occurred within U.S. territory and contributed to the inci-
dent arguably rendered a civil settlement of these claims (outside the formal provisions of
two tragedies; and it is notobvious, as a matter of either law or policy, that theyshould be resolved in like fashion.
Among other salient differences, the SOFA does not, by its terms, govern the claims in the Namibia incident, and
the victims of the German-U.S. collision were exclusively military personnel, rather than, as at Cavalese, civilians.
" Indeed, in an effort to address Thurmond's objections, Robb wrote to German AmbassadorJfirgen Chrobog
and requested that, to ensure timely compensation to German victims of the Cavalese crash, he make every effort
.to press for the rapid resolution of the claims [the Namibia incident's victims' families] have filed with your
government." Letter from U.S. Sen. Charles S. Robb toJfirgen Chrobog, ambassador of the Federal Republic of
Germany (Apr. 22, 1999) (on file with authors). The revised draft of the Cavalese bill that Robb then introduced
in May provided:
No payments under this section ... shall be made to citizens of Germany until the Government of Germany
provides a comparable settlement of the claims arising from the deaths of the United States servicemen
caused by the collision between a United States Air Force C-141 Starlifter aircraft and a German Luftwaffe
Tupelov TU-154M aircraft off the coast of Namibia, on September 13, 1997.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Amendment No. 461, S. 1059, 106th Cong. §349(g)
(1999) [hereinafter Robb-Snowe Amendment].
Telephone interview with Herbert S. Cupo, legislative assistant to Sen. Charles S. Robb (Oct 19, 1999).
Letter from U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen to Sen. Charles S. Robb (July 1999) (on file with au-
thors) (emphasis added). Secretary Cohen's position finds support in case law that precludes certain civil claims
that fall within the SOFA'sjurisdictional regime. See, e.g., Laskero v. Moyer, No. 89-C-5966, 1990 WL 93276 (N.D.
Ill.June 18, 1990) (finding plaintiff's civil action for damages sustained at a British Royal Air Force base barred
by the operation of Article VIII(5) of the SOFA). Indeed, U.S. DistrictJudge Malcolm Howard dismissed a civil
suit brought by relatives of five Belgians killed in the Cavalese incident on essentially these grounds. SeeBelgians'
Lawsuit Is Dismissed, NEws & REcoRD (Greensboro, N.C.), Feb. 9, 2000, at B6A. Echoing Secretary Cohen's
concern,Judge Howard wrote that to decline to apply the SOFA"could conceivably undercut the treaty and create
a cause of action for any overseas military accident. ... Such a result would severely impair the viability of the
claims procedure provided for in the NATO SOFA." Id. It bears emphasizing, however, that Robb's proposal
contemplated a one-time legislative allocation; it did not purport to authorize civil suits outside the SOFA's
jurisdictional regime.
Letter from Secretary Cohen to Senator Robb, supra note 46.
4 Letter from U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen to Sen. Charles S. Robb (May 12,1999) (on file with authors).
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the SOFA) permissible. 9 More critically, however, the SOFA nowhere purports to exclude
supplementary compensation schemes subsequently authorized by the culpable state's
domestic legislative processes. And as Robb observed, even if, as the Department ofDefense
contended, "the SOFA provides the sole remedy in this case," meaning that, the Secretary
of Defense would ordinarily lack independent authority to settle the Cavalese claims, "this
amendment resolves the question. [It] specifically grants the Department the authority they
believe they presently lack....50
The department's concern that the Robb amendmentwould establish a detrimental prec-
edentis understandable as an institutional defense of a multilaterally accepted and routin-
ized procedure of general application to events that will certainly recur. The necessary on-
going training with modern weaponry is inherently dangerous and will inevitably injure
innocent civilians. Thus, the Department of Defense, qua defendant, has an interest in a
procedure that regularizes the liquidation of damages in a nonpolitical fashion. That inter-
est, unquestionably, is a legislative purpose of the SOFA, but it is not its only legislative pur-
pose. The SOFA was also inspired by a desire to minimize the friction that incidents like
Cavalese would generate with foreign publics, whose support for a U.S. military presence in
their midst is a conditio sine qua non.
The gravamen of Senator Robb's contention was that the latter legislative purpose would
be frustrated in this case, because "blind adherence to the perceived requirements of the
SOFA is causingfriction with our NATO allies, not reducingit."5  That seemed to be at least
the short-term consequence of the congressional rejection of Robb's initiative; the NATO
states that lost nationals at Cavalese deplored Congress's ultimate rejection of the bill.1
2
Moreover, far from expressing concern about its supposed departure from the formal terms
of the SOFA, the German, Polish, and Belgian governments endorsed Robb's proposal; the
Belgian ambassador plainly stated his view that the" 'legislative initiative is not incompatible
with the SOFA-procedure.'"" As a one-time legislative allocation, the Cavalese bill did not
threaten to establish a precedent at odds with the SOFA. To the contrary, as Robb noted,
the amendment "by its terms affects only this case. It does not bind the DoD to settle other
cases-just this case. And to get this done again would require another act of Congress, and
I can attest that is no easy feat."54 Ironically, a similar "precedent" had been enacted by Con-
4 9 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which waives the sovereign immunity to civil suit of the United States
for certain torts committed by its agents or employees, ordinarily does not apply to "[a]ny claim arising in a
foreign country." 28 U.S.C. §2680(k) (1994); see Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993) (holding an FTCA
suit for injuries arising out of acts or omissions in Antarctica barred, on the grounds that Antarctica falls within
the "foreign country" exception to the FTCA's waiver ofsovereign immunity); Meredith v. United States, 330 F.2d
9 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 867 (1964) (dismissing under the "foreign country" exception to the FTCAa suit
for injuries sustained at the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok). Under the "operative effect" doctrine, however, FTCA
claims that have their "operative effect" (the injury) in a foreign country can nonetheless be deemed to "arise"
in the United States if the negligent acts resulting in injury occurred wholly or principally in U.S. territory. See, e.g.,
Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (upholding plaintiff's FTCA claim for false arrest against a
§2680 (k) challenge because, although the arrestwas effected in Germany, the instructions to make the arrest and
other operative facts giving rise to plaintiff's injury had occurred in the District of Columbia); see also Leaf v,
United States, 588 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1978).
"0 145 CONG. REc., supra note 3, at *S3086.
'1 Id. at *S3087 (emphasis added).
I2 talianJustice Minister Oliviero Diliberto said that the United States "ha[s] made fools of us for the second
time .... It's another insupportable slight to the ... victims of a slaughter that still, today, one year later, hasn't
foundjustice." Congress Kills Cable CarReparation Provision, NEWS&REC. (Greensboro, N.C.), May 15,1999, atB4A.
Cabinet Undersecretary Minniti, expressing the discontent of the Italian public over both the court-martial and
the refusal to award direct compensation, stated, "We do not consider this matter closed .... It is even more
upsetting when one considers the two sentences, which created deep dissatisfaction." Compensation Issue Angers
Italy, Reuters, May 16, 1999, available in 1999 WL 17592214. Senator Robb noted in his floor speech that "[o]ur
allies, especially Italy where we have strategically important basing agreements, are outraged by our lack of
accountability. They feel angry and betrayed." 145 CONG. REC., supra note 3, at *$3087.
53 145 CONG. REc., supranote 3, at*$3087; seealsoLetterfrom German AmbassadorJfirgen Chrobog to U.S. Sen.
Ted Stevens (May 11, 1999) (on file with authors) (expressing support for the Robb-Snowe Amendment).
' Robb Staff Notes, supra note 38.
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gress the previous year, when it set aside $20 million to enable Cavalese to rebuild the
gondola 55-a form of compensation wholly "unauthorized" by the SOFA. Paradoxically, this
legislation drew no objection from either Congress or the Department of Defense. "Let us
show the world," Robb concluded in his Senate floor speech, that "we care as much about
loss of life as we do about loss of property.... The honor of the United States is at stake."5
But despite the efforts of Robb and others, the Department of Defense and diverse groups
in Congress continued to oppose the amendment. Robb's initiative to compensate the Cava-
lese victims' families directly thus died, a victim of circumstances that reflected less the
national attitude of the United States than the unfortunate, but inevitable, consequences
of partisan politics and a government of divided powers.
The United States subsequently emphasized, in the words of the U.S. Information Service,
that congressional rejection of compensation does not "in any way reduce or alter the com-
mitment of the United States to fulfill its commitment to provide compensation." 7 The agency
reaffirmed the national commitment, under the SOFA, to reimburse Italy for 75 percent of
whatever compensation its courts determine to be appropriate for the claimants' families.'
Notwithstanding U.S. adherence to this legal commitment, the congressional impasse and
the strict formalism reflected in the position of the Defense Department evince a policy deci-
sion with potentially troubling implications for U.S.-Italian relations-and, in general, for U.S.
forces stationed elsewhere around the globe, all of whom rely upon the goodwill of their host
state. Ordinarily, in an incident like Cavalese, the victims' claims, absent congressional authori-
zation of direct compensation, would be relegated to the host state's courts. And in Italy-
which, we can assume, is not unique in this regard-one commentator has noted that domes-
tic courts are "not best known for making swift rulings, with most civil cases such as compen-
sation taking years."5 9 Consequentlyjustice delayed in this case, particularly for those fami-
lies that lost their primary financial supporter in the incident, would have extended and
aggravated the indignation and inflicted political costs on the United States.
Although Congress and the Defense Department could not be persuaded of the wisdom
of departing from the exclusive application of the SOFA, the Italian legislature, recognizing
the unusual nature and severity of the Cavalese incident, intervened to expedite compen-
sation. In November 1999, the lower house's Defense Committee approved a bill to set aside
$42 million (roughly the same amount that Robb's bill would have authorized) to compensate
the twenty families, ° and shortly thereafter, this measure passed without difficulty in the Ital-
ian Senate.61 Following its adoption, Ambassador Thomas M. Foglietta affirmed the U.S.
commitment to honor its SOFA obligations by paying 75 percent of this compensation. 2
The Italian law, and its implementation in accordance with the terms of the SOFA, thus
resolved the immediate issue of compensation and alleviated some of the burdens suffered
by the victims' families. But it remains to be seen whether it will repair the Italian public's
perception that America in fact declined, in the words of President Clinton, to "unambigu-
5 See 144 CONG. REc. H8657-07, *H8670 (daily ed. Sept. 25,1998); idatS9695-01,*S9710 (daily ed.July30,1998).
5 145 CONG. REC., supra note 3, at *$3087; see also Letter from U.S. Sen. Charles S. Robb to U.S. Secretary of
Defense William Cohen (Oct. 1, 1998) (on file with authors) (arguing that if "Section 8113 of H.R. 4103 [which
authorized payments under the previous year's Defense Appropriations bill to those who suffered property
damage as a result of the Cavalese incident] violates the Status of Forces Agreement," then "it would appear that
as a policy matter we are willing to violate the SOFA for loss of property but not loss of life").
17 Congress Kills Cable Car Reparation Provision, supra note 52.
See id.
5 Compensation Issue Angers Italy, supra note 52.
oSee Italy: Cable Car Victim Compensation Bill Nears Approva4 World News Connection, Nov. 16,1999, available in
1999 WL 26463407.
"1 See Gondola Accident Victims' Families to Get Damages, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1999, at B17; U.S. Envoy Hails
Compensation LawAfterItalian Ski-Lift Disaster, Agence France-Presse, Dec. 1, 1999, available in 1999 WL 25153776.
'2 See Gondola Accident ictims'Families to Get Damages, supra note 61.
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ously shoulder the responsibility for what happened"6--particularly in view of Ashby's
acquittal on the counts of manslaughter and his early release from the (comparatively triv-
ial) six-month sentence for obstruction ofjustice.' As Prime Minister D'Alema stated in
March 1999, "[The SOFA] is not an American privilege .... Naturally, the convention must
be respected and complied with, because it exists. But we will be much happier to comply
with it if our citizens and our public opinions are reassured that by adopting these pro-
cedures, justice is done."65
II. APPRAISAL
A general principle of law requires that those who cause injury to others compensate
them. Although it is still uncertain whether this principle applies to instances in which the
injury is caused in the context of preparation for or conduct of armed conflict and in the
absence of criminal responsibility,66 the Status ofForces Agreement remains an entirely ade-
quate process for discharging the general legal obligation it establishes. But since legal
arrangements are always embedded in political contexts, part of the appraisal of the viability
of particular legal arrangements necessarily includes the extent to which they also fulfill
indispensable political requirements.
6
As we observed above, one of the political requirements for the long-term stationing abroad
of U.S. military forces and their conduct of readiness exercises is strong popular support in
the receiving state, especially one that is a functioning democracy. During the Cold War, when
the perception that the presence of U.S. forces benefited the receiving state was likely to be
widespread, popular willingness to bear some of the inevitable collateral costs may have been
greater, so that the slower pace of liquidation and payment of damages under the SOFA re-
gime would have been politically satisfactory.
With the end of the Cold War, however, the popular perception in many foreign countries
of the need for the long-term presence of U.S. forces and the willingness to absorb some of
the ineluctable collateral costs appear to have declined;' consequently, the orderly proce-
dure for compensation established by the SOFA may no longer meet the political, as well
as the legal, requirements that the SOFA regime serves. The Department of Defense, which
defended the exclusivity of the SOFA procedure in the Cavalese incident and resisted, on
See note 27 supra and corresponding text.
Ashby's acquittal from individual criminal liability does not, of course, impute any greater legal obligation
on the United States to provide civil compensation. Butit contributed to a perception that the United States had
refused to accept responsibility for the incident, and it therefore bears consideration as part of the overarching
political contextinwhich the merits ofSenatorRobb's supplementary compensation scheme should be evaluated.
Independently of its legal ramifications, national policy should evince sensitivity to the potential political impact
of Ashby's acquittal.
OJoint Press Conference of the President and Prime Minister D 'Alema of Italy, supra note 27, at 6.
6 SeeW. Michael Reisman, The Lessons of Qana, 22 YALEJ. INT'LL. 381,397-98 (1997).
7 Outside the NATO context, recognition of these political requirements has at times motivated the provision
ofsubstantial exgratiapayments to foreign nationals injured by U.S. military activities. For instance, duringWorld
WarHI, U.S. planes mistakenly bombed Schaffhausen, a Swiss city located at the Swiss-German border on the north
bank of the Rhine. The United States apologized to Switzerland for inadvertently violating its neutrality and pro-
vided compensation both for property damage and for the death and wounding of civilians. SeeDetlev F. Vagts,
Switzerland, International Law and World WarII, 91 AJIL 466, 468 (1997) (editorial comment); see also Detev F.
Vagts, TheRole of Switzerland. Neutrality Law in World WarIl, 20 CARDoZo L. REv. 459,466 n.32 (1998) (noting the
$14,371,000 U.S. settlement of Swiss claims for civilian deaths and property damage sustained during World War
II as a consequence of U.S. military action). More recently, the United States offered to pay compensation to the
families of the 290 civilians killed when the USS Vincennes mistakenly destroyed an Iranian commercial airliner
on a regularlyscheduled flightfrom BandarAbbas to Dubai. SeeDavid L. Peace, MajorMariimeEvents in thePersian
Gulf Between 1984 and 1991:A Juridical Analysis, 31 VA.J. INT'L L. 545,558-60 (1991).
" The closure of the Clark Air Force Base and the Subic Bay Naval Station in the Philippines is a case in point.
See generally Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., The Philippine Bases and the Status ofForces Agreement: Lessons for the Future,
MIL L. REV., Summer 1992, at 67.
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principle, any deviation from it, might wish to incorporate such changes in the overall polit-
ical context into its future calculation. These changes may periodically require the develop-
ment of supplementary strategic compensation procedures, such as those proposed by
Senator Robb.
Unquestionably, preserving the values ofpredictability and regularity served by the SOFA's
compensation scheme remains critical and, from a parochial perspective, perhaps "penny
wise." But in the post-Cold War global order, in which popular goodwill in the host state
represents, even more than in the past, a conditio sine qua non for the continued stationing
of U.S. troops in geostrategic allied nations, neglecting its preconditions by focusing solely
on the values served by legal formalism could well prove "pound foolish."
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Herbert S. Cupo.
THE FRANCIS DEAK PRIZE
The Board of Editors is pleased to announce that the Francis Deik Prize for 2000 was
awarded to Hannes L. Schloemann of Baker & McKenzie, Berlin, and Stefan OhlhoffofWil-
mer, Cutler & Pickering, Berlin, for their article entitled "Constitutionalization" and Dispute
Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, which appeared in the April
1999 issue.
The prize was established by Philip Cohen in memory of Dr. Francis Dek, an inter-
national legal scholar and lifelong member of the American Society of International Law,
to honor a younger author who has published a meritorious contribution to international
legal scholarship in the American Journal.
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